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parents and co-resident children, motivated by the increasing popularity of cash 
transfers targeted at children, and limited evidence of their efficacy. It argues that this 
provides information on parental altruism which, though commonly assumed, has 
been challenged in recent research. The main finding is that the within-household 
allocation of resources is consistent with altruism. A further finding is that households 
that smoke (spend on tobacco) systematically spend less on children.  
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1    Introduction 
Parent altruism is a critical assumption in many economic models, ranging from 
models of education and child labour (e.g. Becker 1991, Basu and Van 1998) to 
models of macroeconomic policy (e.g. Barro, 1974). Although, for both biological 
and sociological reasons, it would seem a plausible assumption, the evidence does not 
lend it unanimous support. In the few microeconomic studies that set out to test 
parental altruism, it is rejected (e.g. Cox and Rank 1992, Altonji et al 1992, 1997, 
Hayashi 1995). Some other studies that are not directly concerned with parent 
altruism also exhibit results that suggest it merits investigation. For example, a recent 
study of the UK child benefit finds that it is spent disproportionately on alcohol 
(Blow, Walker and Zhu 2004). In their overview of the OECD-country literature, 
Blow et al (2004) argue that “there is little evidence to show that giving poor parents 
more money makes for better children”. Mayer (1997) argues that incrementing the 
resources available to parents may not improve child welfare if parents are 
incompetent, myopic or selfish. In their survey of the determinants of children’s 
attainments, Haveman and Wolfe (1995: p.1856) conclude that although there is often 
a correlation between parental SES and child outcomes, a causal effect of parental 
income has been harder to establish.  
These studies are important from a policy perspective because they suggest 
that we cannot assume that cash transfers given to parents translate into child 
welfare.
1 Almost all governments in OECD and transition economies offer 
unconditional child benefits and, in developing countries, cash transfers targeted at 
children are an increasingly important element of anti-poverty programs. There is an 
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The first version of this paper has been available as Bhalotra (2001). 
1 The fact that some other studies find positive effects on children of income controlled by 
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evident agency problem when the transfer is controlled by the parent although 
intended for the child since parents may use it to finance tobacco or alcohol 
purchases, or to increase their own leisure. In sum, establishing whether or not parents 
are altruistic influences whether child poverty may be more effectively addressed by 
cash transfers or by input subsidies since unconditional cash transfers will only have 
the desired effect under parental altruism.  
Altruism has been relatively neglected in the literature on household decision-
making, which has been preoccupied with preference heterogeneity. In the non-
traditional models that allow preference heterogeneity, agents can have egoistic or 
caring preferences (e.g. Browning and Chiappori 1998), and the extent of caring or 
altruism can influence allocations. There is limited research focused on this, although 
Browning and Lechene (2001) investigate income pooling (or sharing) together with 
the extent of caring within the family, using data on Canadian couples. The household 
literature has focused on couples, children have been cast as “..consumers of goods 
chosen and provided by loving or dutiful parents” (Lundberg and Pollak 1996). In 
contrast, previous research set in low-income contexts has often implicitly (e.g. Cigno 
1991) or explicitly (e.g. Gupta 2000, Fyfe 1989, pp. 73-76) cast parents as selfish, 
having and using children to perform functions that markets fail to perform.
2 Rigorous 
empirical testing of these conflicting assumptions is limited.
3  
This paper investigates the relative weight on (above-subsistence) child 
consumption in the parents’ utility function; the null of egoistic parents corresponding 
to this weight being zero. As this weight equals the ratio of the marginal income 
effects on child and parent consumption, the analysis draws attention to the fact that a 
possible explanation of small income effects on child outcomes identified in some 
earlier studies is limited altruism. Using data from rural Pakistan, m-demands (defined 
in section 2.2) are estimated to investigate whether child consumption exhibits a 
positive co-variation with adult consumption. Under the null of parental egoism, there 
is no such co-variation as marginal income is spent entirely on adult consumption: the 
case of a horizontal expansion path.  
                                                 
2 At the same time, historical and anthropological studies of child labour have adduced 
evidence suggesting parental selfishness (e.g., Parsons and Goldin 1989, Nardinelli 1990 
(p.94), Burra 1995). 
3 In the working paper version of their JPE (2004) paper, Rogers and Swinnerton (2003) state 
that the only empirical studies of altruism that they are aware of are Parsons and Goldin 
(1989) and the earlier version of this paper, Bhalotra (2001).   4  
 
 
Previous research on inter-generational altruism (e.g. Altonji et al 1992, 1997, 
Hayashi 1995; see Laitner 1997 for a survey) has tested the income transfer derivative 
restriction or income pooling
4, which is a strong version of altruism. Given that this is 
rejected in previous research, it is relevant to investigate the weaker definition of 
altruism that is adopted in this paper.
5 This weaker definition is also the relevant one 
if we are interested in how cash transfers are spent. According to this, parents are 
altruistic if they make positive transfers to children, at the expense of their own 
consumption, with the size of transfers being a function of the degree of altruism (e.g. 
Becker 1981). While previous research on inter-generational altruism (cited above) 
has focused on gifts and bequests flowing from parents to adult children living in 
separate homes, this paper is concerned with the intra-household allocation of 
resources to minors. Indeed, it is the first investigation of altruism towards young co-
resident children. The emphasis on childhood is of particular importance given that 
parental expenditures at this time are known to have far-reaching consequences on the 
future success of their children. This is especially relevant in low-income countries 
where the role of the state in provision of health-care and education is limited, 
resulting in a larger role for parental income and parental preferences. 
Research on cash transfers targeted at children has tended to implicitly assume 
parental altruism (e.g. Edmonds 2004, Attanasio and Lechene 2002, Kooreman 2000), 
although Duflo (2003) finds evidence consistent with grandmothers being altruistic 
while grandfathers are not. The data used in this paper do not contain information on a 
cash transfer. To the extent that there are labeling effects whereby transfers for 
children are spent disproportionately on children, the estimates in this paper will 
understate altruism. Therefore rejection of parental egoism is robust to the absence of 
data on transfers.
6 
                                                 
4 Let A denote adult, C child, m income, and X consumption. For simplicity, ignore public 
goods in the household. Let T be the transfer from the parent to the child, given as the 
difference between the income and the consumption of parents, T=Ya-Xa. Then ∂ T/∂ Ya= 1- 
(∂ Xa/∂ Ya) and ∂ T/∂ Yc = -(∂ Xa/∂ Yc). Now if we use the income pooling restriction that 
∂ Xa/∂ Ya = ∂ Xa/∂ Yc then it follows that ∂ T/∂ Yc-  ∂ T/∂ Ya = -1. This is the income transfer 
derivative restriction. It says that a one dollar decrease in child income coupled with a one 
dollar increase in parent income will result in an increase in parental transfers of one dollar. 
5 In this paper, the null is a strict version of selfishness and, in earlier studies, the null is a 
strict version of altruism. It would not be surprising, a priori, to find that actual behaviour lies 
between these two extremes.  
6 Based on Bhalotra (2001) and discussion with me, Chris Schluter and Jackie Wahba have, in 
work-in-progress, employed the motivation and the core idea in this paper to perform a test of   5  
 
 
This paper offers a useful illustration of the use of m-demands (section 2.2), 
which involve conditioning on the level of a reference good rather than on total 
expenditure. M-demands may have an advantage if the reference good is measured 
with less error. They are especially useful when, as is common, data on total 
expenditure are unavailable (see Browning 1998). The survey data analysed in this 
paper do contain total expenditure, and this fact is exploited to compare m-demand 
estimates with estimates of the corresponding pair of Marshallian demands (see 
section 2.3). An advantage of looking, in this way, at the ratio of income effects on 
child and adult consumption, rather than directly at the income effect on the child 
outcome, is that it nets out considerations of income uncertainty and lumpiness in 
expenditure (see Kooreman 2000, footnote 5 for example). 
The main finding in this paper is that the null of egoistic parents is rejected. 
The m-demand estimates show that, for every additional rupee spent on adult clothing,  
expenditure on child clothing increases by 0.52 of a rupee. Estimates of a pair of 
standard Marshallian demand equations for child and for adult consumption show 
positive income effects on each, with a ratio of 0.67 (which is insignificantly different 
from 0.52). In both cases, expenditure
7 is instrumented with a polynomial in income 
(following Keen 1986, Blundell et al 1998, Browning 1998, Browning and Chiappori 
1998), and the significance of the endogenous expenditure variable is subject to tests 
that yield the correct rejection probabilities even when the instruments are weak 
(Moreira 2002).  
The main result is shown to be robust to a number of alternative specifications 
of the model. These include allowing for non-separability of child consumption and 
adult leisure, and allowing for the presence of child labour. Functional form, other 
controls, and other instruments are also investigated, and they produce no important 
changes in the results. 
The main specification involves child and adult clothing. As a further 
robustness check, alternative specifications are estimated in which other categories of 
adult consumption constitute the reference good in the m-demand (see section 2.2). 
The results are robust to this change, with one interesting exception. This is the case 
                                                                                                                                            
altruism using the Progresa data which have information on cash transfers. Their preliminary 
results corroborate those in this paper. 
7 In the m-demand, adult expenditure is the key regressor while, in the Marshallian demand, 
this is total expenditure.   6  
 
 
when the reference good is tobacco expenditure, and the sample is restricted to 
households that “smoke” (purchase tobacco) in order to meet the requirement that the 
reference good is a normal good (see section 4.2). This specification shows that when 
tobacco expenditure increases, there is no contemporaneous increase in expenditure 
on child clothing. Using the full sample of households to predict expenditure on child 
clothing for the samples that do and do not purchase tobacco, we find that smoking 
households spend less on children, other things being equal. This is consistent with 
the addictive properties of tobacco, which may result in it behaving like a subsistence 
good. Given that, in these data, tobacco is disproportionately consumed by males, this 
finding is also consistent with the view that money in the hands of fathers translates 
into child welfare less effectively than does money in the hands of mothers (e.g. 
Thomas 1990). 
An analytical framework is sketched in section 2, which also discusses the 
potential problem that the results of the analysis may be consistent not only with 
altruism but also with exchange motives. Section 3 describes the data and estimation 
issues. The main results are presented in section 4. Section 5 presents a range of 
specification checks, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2    An Analytical Framework  
As in previous research on inter-generational altruism, parents are treated as a unit. In 
line with previous research on human capital, it is assumed that parents decide on the 
allocation of resources to minor children. There is considerable evidence from field 
studies in south Asia that, when children work, they hand over their earnings to their 
parents.
8 The implied assumption that income-pooling holds for families with child 
labour is investigated in section 5.2, and confirmed. This paper is agnostic on the 
question of income pooling when the children have grown up to form their own 
households. As discussed above, this is precisely the question investigated in previous 
research, where the focus has been on adult children living independently of their 
parents (e.g. Altonji et al 1997).  
This paper faces the endemic problem of distinguishing which of altruism and 
exchange motives dominate at the margin (e.g. Cox and Rank 1992). In other words, 
                                                 
8 See Khan (2001) for Pakistan, Gupta (2000) and Burra (1995) for India, and the Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (1996, Table 5.12, p.54) for Bangladesh. For several anecdotes 
suggesting parental power over children, see Fyfe (1989, pp.73-76).    7  
 
 
parental expenditure on children may be motivated by the expectation of return 
transfers from their children once they grow up. The exchange hypothesis is 
undermined by problems of intergenerational contracting (e.g. Baland and Robinson 
2000). Moreover, the distinction between exchange and altruism may be seen as 
inherently impossible to make. Thus, even when the child’s utility is an argument in 
the parental utility function, parents are maximizing their own utility and, by that 
criterion, may be regarded as selfish, not altruistic (Becker 1981, p. 2). Becker 
clarifies that the definition of altruism that he proposes is one that is relevant to 
behaviour rather than to the more philosophical question of what “really” motivates 
people. This is also the case in this paper. Indeed, to the extent that this paper is 
motivated by the question of how effective cash transfers made to parents are, what 
matters is how (marginal) resources are divided between parents and children. The 
perspective is that expenditures on young children influence their future lifechances. 
Once children have received these “gifts”, they may or may not choose to reciprocate. 
The question of reciprocity is of theoretical interest, and while relevant to other fields 
of enquiry, including the welfare of the elderly, it is largely irrelevant in the current 
context.
9  
The prediction of the altruistic model that is tested is described in section 2.1. 
As discussed, interpretation of the results of this paper in terms of altruism should 
bear in mind the caveat that, at a deeper motivational level, altruism may be 
contaminated by exchange. In section 2.2, m-demands are derived and defined, and 
compared with the conventional Marshallian demands. Section 2.3 shows that 
altruism corresponds to positive income effects.  
2.1    The hypothesis 
Altruism towards children is captured by a utility function for parents that depends 
upon child consumption.
10 The degree of altruism is the relative weight accorded to 
                                                 
9 A similar problem of disentangling preferences from incentives or constraints arises in the 
literature on intra-household allocation that is motivated to test for “discrimination” against 
girls (e.g. Deaton 1989, Ahmad and Morduch 1993). As noted by Behrman (1997: section 
3.3.2), these studies do not permit identification of whether observed effects of gender reflect 
preference weights, or whether they reflect differential market incentives such as arise if boys 
earn more on the labour market than girls with the same level of human capital. The same 
applies to studies of intrahousehold allocations to biological vs non-biological children that 
relate observed differences in expenditure to parental preferences (e.g. Case, Lin and 
McLanahan 2000). 
10 Becker, in fact used the more restrictive formulation of caring in which parental utility 
depends upon child utility, and this is often used for its greater tractability (e.g. Browning and   8  
 
 
child consumption in the parental utility function, and the null of non-altruism (or 
egoism) is investigated as the restriction that this weight is zero. It is shown in the 
Appendix that, for the commonly used class of additively separable utility functions, 
the null implies that the demand for child goods is invariant to the level of adult 
consumption. This is the case of a horizontal income expansion path. Under the 
alternative of altruism, the demands for child and adult consumption exhibit a positive 
covariance. The underlying idea is very simple. When the adult cares about child 
consumption then, at constant prices, any increase in income is used to buy more of 
both the child and the adult good so that equality in the marginal rate of substitution 
condition is maintained. This is illustrated using the Stone-Geary case. 
The Stone-Geary case 
Consider the Stone-Geary preferences,  
 
 
where U is utility of the parent,  C A   and   are the subsistence levels of adult and child 
consumption, and above-subsistence quantities are assumed positive. It is assumed 
that even the egoistic parent ensures that the child survives. For this illustration, there 
is just 1 A and 1 C good. The relative weight that parents place on child consumption 
is β /α . Solving the first order conditions gives  
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where  Xi is expenditure on i=(C, A) and    i X is the corresponding subsistence 
expenditure which, when demands are conditioned on demographics, may be assumed 
to be captured by the equation intercept. As income changes, the new optimal 
amounts of child and adult consumption are chosen so as to satisfy the equality in (2). 
Rearranging, 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Chiappori 1988). In a caring model, estimated demand parameters will reflect both parental 
preferences and the relation between child utility and child consumption. As long as child 
utility is increasing in child consumption, the prediction that is tested in this paper is not 
altered by using this specification. 




This shows that regressing XC on XA delivers β /α , a measure of altruism. If β /α =1, 
child and adult consumption are given equal weight, if β /α >1 then children are 
“favoured” and if β /α <1, then adults are “favoured”.  
Altruism is a word that excites a host of interpretations. In this paper it is 
defined simply to refer to the marginal change in expenditure on children that is 
associated with a change in adult expenditure. Under parent altruism, adults cannot 
increase their own consumption of goods (or leisure) without increasing that of their 
children.
 11  
2.2    M-Demands 
The first order conditions of the altruistic model can be solved to write elements of 
child consumption, Ci, as a function of a category of adult consumption, Aj, and all 
prices (p): 
 
(4)   Ci = f (p, Aj) 
 
These are m-demands which, with Ci and Aj set at their optimal values, describe the 
indifference curve between them. In a system of m-demands, item demands are 
expressed as a function of the quantity of a reference good, rather than total 
expenditure (see Browning 1998). In this case, Aj has been cast as the reference 
good.
12 A condition on the choice of reference good is that it be normal; this is 
established for the data used here (section 3.1). M-demands have been used, implicitly 
                                                 
11 The first version of this paper that is available in the public domain (Bhalotra 2001), 
investigates not only expenditure on child clothing but also schooling and child labour; the 
work on human capital now being in a separate paper (Bhalotra 2004). Following presentation 
of this paper in 2001-2, Marco Manacorda has recently applied the basic idea of investigating 
parental altruism to data on parental and child labour in twentieth century America. His 
evidence, as that in Bhalotra (2004), is consistent with parental altruism. 
12 The “m” arises because m-demands can be derived from the marginal rate of substitution. It 
has no relation to the fact that total expenditure is denoted m. Closed form m-demands are 
obtainable from the first order conditions only for a particular class of utility functions (like 
the LES). However, the fact that we do not have to simultaneously solve for the budget 
constraint makes this approach more widely applicable than it is for Marshallian demands 
(Browning 1998). The choice of reference good is fairly arbitrary but if Ci were defined as the 
reference good instead of Aj, then the estimated coefficient would be ∂ Aj/∂ Ci, and this would 








    ) 3 (  10  
 
 
or explicitly, in Heckman (1974b), Altonji (1986), Meghir and Weber (1996) and 
Attanasio and MaCurdy (1997). Browning (1998) investigates the theoretical 
underpinnings of m-demands, and proposes them as useful in maximising the 
preference information that can be recovered from the data when information on total 
expenditure is unavailable.
13  
In the current context, m-demands offer a natural estimating framework since 
they directly deliver an estimate of the parameter of interest, ∂ XCi/∂ XAj. Since data on 
total expenditure are available in the data used in this paper, for comparison, this 
parameter is also derived from pairs of Marshallian demands (see section 2.3). As 
discussed in section 1, estimation of m-demands or else pairs of Marshallian demands 
is useful compared with estimation of single Marshallian demands because 
comparison of the ways in which child and adult expenditures vary nets out 
considerations of income uncertainty and lumpiness in expenditure. This is relevant to 
our analysis of expenditure on clothing, which may be regarded as a durable good (see 
Kooreman 2000, footnote 5 for example). M-demands have a potential advantage to 
the extent that expenditures on sub-aggregates of consumption (Aj) are measured with 
less error than total expenditure.
14 
2.3    Ratio of marginal income effects 
An alternative method of deriving m-demands that lends further intuition to 
the notion of altruism in this paper involves a pair of Marshallian demands: 
 
(5)   Ci = Ci (p, m) 
(6)   Aj = Aj (p, m) 
 
where  Ci and Aj are assignable child and adult consumption and m is household 
income (or total expenditure). As long as (6) is monotonic, guaranteed by Aj being 
                                                 
13 Another advantage of m-demands, argued by Browning, is that it is not necessary to 
observe all quantities in order to model the demand for a subset of goods. In contrast, the 
usual practice of modeling demands as Marshallian involves invoking (often implausible) 
separability assumptions. 
14 Errors creep into the calculation of total expenditure through imputation of the value of 
home-produced consumption, consumption of wages in kind, gifts, remittances, and any 
public transfers. In addition, there are fundamental difficulties in incorporating into estimates 
of total expenditure, the value of durables and leisure. Measurement of Aj (e.g. adult clothing 
expenditure) does not encounter these problems.   11  
 
 
normal through the range of incomes, it can be inverted to get m = m(p, Aj) (see 
Browning 1998). Substituting this in (5) gives: 
 
(7) Ci = Ci
 (p, m(p, Aj)) = f(p, Aj) 
 
which is nothing but (4), the m-demand for child consumption. This formulation 
clarifies that income contains no additional information once the level of the reference 
good is held constant. Studying (7) also reveals that ∂ Ci/∂ Aj is simply the ratio of the 
income effects on the two goods, Ci and Aj: 
 
If Aj is normal, the denominator of the final term in (8) is positive. Thus testing for 
altruism by investigating whether ∂ Ci/∂ Aj>0 boils down to finding out if ∂ Ci/∂ m>0, or 
if child consumption (Ci) is normal. In other words, altruism predicts that the demand 
for child goods is increasing in parental income.
15  
Although this fact has been exploited, for example, in Cox and Rank (1992), 
popular discussion of the size of the effect of parental income on child outcomes tends 
to neglect the fact that it contains information about altruism. This is surprising in 
view of the consistent rejection of altruism in the handful of studies that have directly 
investigated it (see section 1). The reason is, likely, that the starting point is typically 
a Beckerian model in which altruism is assumed (e.g. Laitner 1997). Empirical tests 
based on such a model are then tests not only of the phenomenon of interest but also 
of the assumption of altruism.  
 
3    Data & Estimation 
3.1    Data & variables 
The data refer to 2400 rural households containing 18382 individuals interviewed for 
the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) conducted by the World Bank in 
conjunction with the Government in 1991. There is extensive information on income, 
                                                 
15 The test has power against most relevant alternatives except for the one where there is no 
income effect on the child good as would be the case, for example, if preferences were quasi-
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expenditure and the demographic characteristics of households. The average rural 
household spends 54% of its budget on food, a measure of their poverty.
16 
The dependent variable in the analysis is expenditure on child clothing and 
footwear (henceforth “child clothing”, C). The reference good is expenditure on adult 
clothing and footwear (henceforth “adult clothing”, A1). Assignable clothing 
expenditures are commonly used in empirical research on intrahousehold allocation 
(e.g. Kooreman 2000, Blow et al 2004, Browning et al 1994). Alternative reference 
goods explored are tea and coffee (A2) and tobacco (A3)
17. Expenditure on each of the 
adult items is quite small (see Table 1). As a check against measurement error, results 
are also reported for the aggregate of the three adult expenditures, referred to as A4. It 
remains useful to consider A1, A2 and A3 separately both because using multiple adult 
goods increases the power of the test, and because the test is then not dominated by 
properties peculiar to the individual goods. For example, tobacco is potentially 
addictive and is a predominantly male good. Neither of these considerations applies to 
expenditure on adult clothing. All expenditures are normalized, per adult and per child 
respectively. Inclusion in the model of variables describing the age-gender 
composition of the household allows for any scale economies. Table 1 reports 
elasticities of item expenditure with respect to total expenditure. This confirms 
normality of the adult goods (see section 2.2).  
The conditioning variables in the model are as follows. Demographic variables 
that reflect the enormous observed heterogeneity between households appear 
additively in the specification. The logarithm of household size is included together 
with the proportions of household members in an exhaustive set of age-gender 
categories (under-10, 10-14, 15-24, 25-59 and 60-plus). Other exogenous variables 
allowed to influence the demand for child goods are the gender and the religion of the 
head of household, an indicator for whether the household owns land, a measure of 
the size of the plot (zero if no land is owned), indicators for land tenancy 
arrangements (whether renting or sharecropping land), an indicator for whether the 
household owns an enterprise, community-level wage rates for adults and children, 
indicators for the presence of a primary, middle and secondary school in the village 
                                                 
16 Adjusting for demographics, foodshare is an (inverse) indicator of welfare (see Deaton 
1997). 
17 Not alcohol because it is outlawed in Pakistan. While we cannot rule out the possibility that 
under-15s consume some tea or coffee, it is sufficient for our purposes that tea and coffee are 
predominantly consumed by adults.   13  
 
 
(relevant to the full price of schooling), and province dummies to account for spatial 
price variation. Some variations on this specification are explored in section 5. 
Following international convention, children are defined as under-15. The 
average household size in the sample is 9 and the average number of “adults” (age 
greater than 14) 4.5. Thus, while the theoretical discussion is cast in terms of parents 
and children, in an empirical context where integrated families are common, we are in 
fact investigating altruism of adults (that may include uncles, aunts, sisters-in-law and 
grandparents) towards children. This does not make the analysis less interesting from 
a biological perspective since household members in Asian households are typically 
closely related to one another. This is less true in sub-Saharan Africa where child 
fostering and adoption of orphans is widespread, and blood relations within the 
household can grow quite dilute (e.g. Case, Paxson and Ableidinger, 2002).  
3.2    Identification & estimation 
The estimated m-demands are  
 
(9) C = γ jAj + θ Z + e 
 
where household-level subscripts are omitted to avoid clutter, C and Aj were defined 
in the preceding section as expenditures on child and adult consumption, Z is a vector 
of exogenous controls, and the coefficient of interest, γ j, is β /α j, where β  is the weight 
on child consumption and α j is the weight on adult consumption (section 2.1). Of 
course, γ j is different for the different adult reference goods, (Aj, j=1,..,4), since each is 
allowed to have its own weight in the adult preference function. If γ j>0, then the null 
of parental egoism is rejected, subject to the caveat regarding exchange motives that 
was elaborated in section 2.  
In general, the reference good in an m-demand is endogenous just as, in 
Marshallian demands, total expenditure is endogenous (e.g., Deaton 1985, Browning 
1998). Following Browning (1998), it is instrumented with a polynomial (a cubic) in 
household income. Given the level of the reference good, income should not affect 
consumption (see section 2.3). Previous studies of demand similarly take income to be 
a valid instrument for expenditure (Browning 1998: section 6.2, Blundell et al 1998, 
Browning and Chiappori 1998). The argument is that income is correlated with 
expenditure but uncorrelated with infrequency of purchase and with measurement   14  
 
 
error in expenditure (e.g. Keen 1986).
18 To investigate whether the IV strategy is 
robust to non-separability of adult leisure and child consumption, adult labour supply 
is included as an additional regressor (section 5.3).
19  
Estimation is initially by the two-step efficient generalised method of 
moments estimator (GMM). This is more efficient than 2SLS and robust to 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form, as well as to arbitrary intra-cluster correlation 
(see Wooldridge 2002: p.193). Since households living in close geographic proximity 
will tend to have some unobservables (like climate, soil or culture) in common, the 
reported standard errors are adjusted to allow for intra-cluster correlations (see Deaton 
(1997), Chapter 2). The Hansen-Sargan J statistic, a version of the Sargan statistic that 
is robust to heteroskedasticity, is presented as a test of the joint null hypothesis that 
the excluded instruments are valid (see Davidson and McKinnon 1993: pp.235-36). In 
no case is this rejected.
20 However, the instruments border on being weak. The first-
stage R
2 is in the region of 0.20 and the F-test of the income instruments in the first 
stage is 8.65 in the equation that conditions on adult clothing. It is larger (and >10) for 
the adult goods aggregate, and smaller for tea & coffee and tobacco (see Table 2, 
panel 1). When there is a single endogenous regressor, a first-stage F statistic smaller 
than 10 indicates that the instruments are weak (Stock & Watson 2002, p.350). In this 
case, the asymptotic approximations that we rely upon when making inferences about 
coefficients on endogenous variables are unsatisfactory (see Bound, Jaeger and Baker 
1995, Staiger and Stock 1997). Following Moreira (2002) and Moreira and Poi 
(2003), valid tests of the structural coefficients estimated by 2SLS and LIML are 
obtained, together with critical values of the Wald and likelihood ratio tests that yield 
correct rejection probabilities even when the instruments are weak. The LIML 
                                                 
18 The assumption that validity of the income instrument rests upon is that the dispersion of 
households over the same budget surface is independent of income. Households can have 
different incomes even if they have the same total expenditure so that, in instrumenting, we 
exploit variations between budget surfaces to identify the m-demand parameters (e.g. 
Browning 1998). 
19 The problem is that, if parents who have a taste for expenditure on children work harder, 
then the error in the child expenditure equation will be correlated with household income, an 
issue that is often ignored.  
20 Since the instruments are the level, the square and the cube of income, a test of 
overidentifying restrictions may be seen a test of functional form. In particular, if the Hansen-
Sargan test had rejected the instruments, this would be an indication that the benchmark 
model (equation 9) is not linear, and that it should probably include higher-order terms in Aj. 
Functional form was directly investigated (see section 5 below) and the linear model could   15  
 
 
estimates (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, pp. 644-51) are reported in preference to 
the 2SLS estimates since they are known to perform better with weak instruments.
21  
 
4    Results 
4.1    Main results 
The estimated equations are of the form displayed in (9). Table 2, panel-1 reports the 
GMM estimates. For both adult clothing (A1) and tea & coffee (A2) (and also for the 
aggregate, A4), the null of selfish parents is decisively rejected: increases in income 
are shared between increases in adult and child consumption, generating a positive 
covariance of the two. As shown in section 2.3, this corresponds to finding significant 
effects of household income on child consumption, given normality of adult 
consumption. As discussed in the preceding section, the 1
st-stage F-statistic suggests 
weak instruments in all cases other than column 4. For this reason, size-adjusted tests 
of the significance of the endogenous variable (Aj) are obtained following the 
conditional approach of Moreira (2002). LIML estimates that are insignificantly 
different from the GMM estimates are shown, together with the associated adjusted 
LR and Wald tests (Table 2, panel-2). Figure 1 plots the adjusted and unadjusted 
confidence intervals for the LR test, which Moreira (2002) shows has better overall 
power properties. This confirms the main finding that, for reference goods other than 
tobacco, the null of a zero coefficient on Aj is rejected.  
The size of ∂ Ci/∂ Aj=β j/α i is not of central interest, but consider, for example, 
the coefficient of 0.52 or 0.56 in column 1, which indicates that the utility weight on 
child clothing is smaller than that attached to adult clothing. This is consistent with 
the assumption made in some theoretical research that the weight that parents attach to 
child consumption is positive but smaller than the weight they attach to their own 
consumption (e.g. Baland and Robinson 2000; also see Laitner 1997). Alternatively, if 
parents treat child goods as necessities (and adult goods as luxuries) then, at some 
point, increases in income will buy more adult goods relative to child goods. This is 
consistent with the finding in Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) of a negative 
income effect on the ratio of child to adult clothing. It is also consistent with the idea 
                                                                                                                                            
not be rejected. Given linearity of the model, the test is a valid test (has correct size) since the 
three income terms are linearly independent- although it may have low power.   16  
 
 
raised in Blow et al (2004) that child consumption may be protected against income 
variation.  
Estimates of the other coefficients in the model are reported in Appendix 
Table A1 of the working paper version (Bhalotra 2004). They show some interesting 
patterns. For example, at a given level of adult clothing expenditure, expenditure on 
child clothing is higher if there are more girls (consumers of child clothing), and also 
if there are more women (decision makers that direct expenditure towards child 
clothing?). That more is spent on girls’ than on boys’ clothing is also seen, for 
example, in the Dutch data analysed by Kooreman (2000). 
4.2    Smoking and child welfare 
There is an apparent anomaly with tobacco (A3) (see column 3, Table 2), the 
results for which suggest that, when tobacco expenditure is increased, there is no 
corresponding increase in child expenditure, consistent with parental selfishness. In 
order to satisfy the requirement that the reference good is normal (see section 2.2), 
these estimates use only the sub-sample (70% of total sample) of households with 
positive tobacco expenditure. A possible interpretation is therefore that there are 
deviations from altruism amongst those households that contain a smoker. In section 
1, it was argued that this is consistent with the addictive properties of tobacco, and 
with it being a predominantly male good. It is also consistent with other similar 
findings in the literature. In their study of the impact on intrahousehold allocation of 
the transfer of child benefit from fathers to mothers in the UK, Lundberg, Pollak and 
Wales (1997: footnote 6) find no impact on alcohol consumption, although they do 
find a significant shift in clothing expenditures, in favour of women’s and children’s 
clothing. This is consistent with alcohol consumption being addictive or sticky. As 
discussed in section 1, another study of the UK child benefit finds that child benefit is 
spent disproportionately on alcohol (Blow et al 2004).   
In order to investigate the tobacco effect further, the equation was re-estimated 
using the full sample, with a dummy denoting positive tobacco expenditure included 
as an additional regressor (Table 3). The dummy is significant and negative, and now 
                                                                                                                                            
21 The 2SLS results are very similar. The LIML estimates do not allow for clustering of 
standard errors (though the GMM estimates do), but the LR test has been shown by Moreira  
(2002) to be robust to departures from normality.   17  
 
 
the coefficient on tobacco expenditure is positive and significant
22. This equation is 
used to predict the level of child clothing expenditure in households that do and do not 
purchase tobacco. Comparing these predictions shows that children are systematically 
worse off in smoking households (see Table 3).
23  
The argument made above, that there may be deviations from altruism 
amongst households that contain smokers, implies that the selection of households 
with positive tobacco expenditure is endogenous. This creates a potential sample 
selection bias in the estimates in column 3 of Table 2. In particular, if unobservables 
that determine what is spent on children are correlated with unobservables (such as 
the discount rate) that determine whether or not a household smokes, then the tobacco 
coefficient may carry a (negative) bias. A good instrument for selection into smoking 
is difficult to find in the PIHS or, indeed, in other cross-sectional household survey 
data.
24 These estimates are therefore only valid under the assumption that, after 
conditioning on numerous sources of observed heterogeneity, the decision to smoke is 
exogenous to the child outcome. If this assumption is unpalatable, then it may be 
deemed that tobacco is not a good reference good, and the analysis rests on 
consideration of the results for A1, A2, and A4 (defined in section 3.1).  
The selection issue here is similar to that acknowledged but left unaddressed 
in Browning et al (1994). In that paper, which aims to test income pooling amongst 
Canadian couples, the sample is selected to contain couples without children and in 
which both partners are in full-time work. The authors reject income pooling but, 
given that selection into full-time work (and into zero fertility, though they do not 
discuss this) is endogenous, their results will have been biased towards rejection of 
                                                 
22 Investigation shows that estimating the equation on the full sample but failing to allow a 
distinct intercept effect for non-smoking households results in an insignificant coefficient on 
tobacco expenditure. Although censoring of a regressor is often ignored in the literature, these 
investigations show that allowing for it can make a difference. 
23 This result does not simply reflect the fact that poverty is positively correlated with both 
smoking and lower expenditures on children because the predicting equation includes the 
level of adult (tobacco) expenditure, which is lower in poorer households. We find that less is 
spent on children in precisely those households in which more is spent on adults (i.e. tobacco 
expenditure is positive). It is useful to note that the propensity to consume tobacco is similar 
amongst poor (bottom 30%) and rich (top 70%) households, being 69% in the former and 
70% in the latter. The budget-share of tobacco is higher in poorer households, although 
nominal spending is lower.   
24 The PIHS community questionnaire does contain information on cigarette prices. 
Regression of expenditure on tobacco on this price produces a positive and significant 
coefficient. This result persists when the dependent variable is redefined as an indicator for   18  
 
 
income pooling to the extent that each partner is more likely to choose full-time work 
when they suspect that the other partner is less likely to share (or pool) their income.  
 
5  Alternative Specifications  
For parsimony, results displayed in this section (see Tables 4, 5) are for the case 
where adult clothing is the reference good, and the benchmark model is that in column 
1 of Table 2. Results using alternative reference goods are available on request. 
5.1    OLS & additional instruments 
Comparison of the GMM and LIML estimates with their OLS counterparts establishes 
the importance of allowing for endogeneity of the reference good (see Table 2). The 
OLS coefficients are biased downward in every case, although the income relation 
dominates heterogeneity for all definitions of the adult good. Similar OLS biases are 
observed in m-demand estimates using Canadian data, and an identification strategy 
similar to that pursued in this paper (Browning 1998). The interpretation of a positive 
correlation of, for example, child and adult clothing in terms of income effects, rather 
than heterogeneity is important if it is thought that tastes for child and adult clothing 
may be positively correlated. A further check against this is provided by using 
alternative reference goods: there is no reason to suppose that tastes for child clothing 
are correlated with tastes for tea & coffee. 
In an alternative specification of the model, a set of overidentifying 
restrictions is added. These include the community unemployment rate and an 
interaction of this with household income, the years of schooling of the mother and 
father of the child, indicators for ownership of land or a household enterprise, and 
acreage of land operated by the household. The main results are robust to the choice 
of instruments. With the additional IV, we are able to test for the validity of the 
income instrument and, indeed, the C-statistic reported in Table 4, column 1 validates 
it. Since the F-test on the expanded IV-set is no larger (and <10), the preferred results 
remain those in Table 2.
25  
                                                                                                                                            
positive tobacco expenditure, and when functional form is changed. This seems to reflect the 
poor quality of the price data, and so this information is not used. 
25 Both the preferred strategy and the alternatives experimented with here are common in the 
literature, exemplified by, for example, Attanasio and Lechene (2003).    19  
 
 
5.2    Allowing for child labour 
The assumption of income pooling was defended in section 2. Nevertheless, 
two strategies are adopted to investigate the possibility that child labour affects the 
relationship of interest. First, the proportion of children in the household who work is 
included as a control variable, and this attracts a negative but insignificant coefficient 
(see Table 4, column 2).
26 A bargaining model in which child workers can claim a 
relatively large share of household resources would predict a positive coefficient on 
the child labour variable. These results are therefore consistent with income pooling. 
The second strategy is to estimate the model on the sample of households in which no 
child works (see column 3). In both columns 2 and 3, the key coefficient, ∂ C/∂ Aj is 
larger but insignificantly different from that in the benchmark case.  
5.3    Controlling for adult labour 
As discussed in section 3.2, income may not be a valid instrument if the 
implicit assumption of weak separability of adult labour and child clothing does not 
hold. This is investigated by including an indicator of adult labour supply as a 
regressor in the consumption model (as in Browning and Meghir 1991). In column 4 
of Table 4, this is defined as the proportion of adults in the household who engage in 
any work that produces a marketable output. Column 5 replaces this with similar 
variables that distinguish men and women in the household.
27 The coefficient on adult 
expenditure is not significantly altered compared with the benchmark model. 
Moreover, the negative sign on all of the adult labour supply variables is consistent 
with altruism: For the same reason that altruism predicts a positive co-variation of 
child consumption with adult consumption, it predicts a positive co-variation of child 
consumption with adult leisure, and therefore, a negative relation with adult labour.
28 
                                                 
26 The child labour variable is instrumented using the community level wage rates for adults 
and children, indicators for the presence of primary, middle and secondary schools in the 
community, and interactions of these community variables with the age of the child. The C-
statistic for these additional identifying restrictions validates them. The qualitative results are 
unchanged if child labour is assumed exogenous. 
27 For the results shown, adult labour is assumed exogenous, just as husband’s labour supply 
has been assumed exogenous in numerous studies of women’s labour supply. Instrumenting 
adult labour with the education and age of the adults and interactions thereof (as in Browning 
and Meghir 1991) produced coefficients that were negative but insignificant, and there was no 
significant change in the coefficient relating child and adult consumption (available on 
request). 
28 A similar negative effect of adult labour supply on child clothing is identified in Kooreman 
(2000). However, he specifies a Marshallian rather than an m-demand, and interprets this 
effect as possibly reflecting the time costs of purchasing child clothing.   20  
 
 
5.4    Endogenous fertility 
Although economists acknowledge that fertility is a choice variable, this is 
commonly ignored in empirical work, where household size is routinely treated as an 
exogenous control variable. A justification of this is to argue that conditioning on size 
produces a short run effect, which may usefully be compared with the corresponding 
long run relation by omitting size (e.g. Deaton 1997: p. 221). Dropping size produces 
the results in column 6, Table 4, which show robustness of the key coefficient to this 
change. 
5.5    Rich vs poor households 
The model was re-estimated on sub-samples corresponding to the top 70% and 
the bottom 30%, respectively, of the distribution of log per capita expenditure. The 
GMM and LIML estimates were poorly determined, possibly on account of the 
reduced size of the sample. The OLS estimates showed no significant difference in 
altruism between the rich and the poor. The OLS coefficient on adult clothing is 0.18 
in each sub-sample (full results available on request), and 0.20 in the full sample (see 
Table 2). 
5.6    Functional form 
The square of expenditure on the reference good was included as an additional 
regressor but in no case was it significant. This is backed by the Hansen-Sargan tests 
(see footnote 20). The equations were also estimated in shares, that is, with the 
dependent variable defined as the ratio of expenditures on Ci and Aj, but this produced 
a worse fit than seen in the reported equations. A further specification investigated 
was that in which all consumption expenditures are in logarithms (see column 1, 
Table 5). Estimates of the key parameters derived from the log models are not 
significantly different from unity (refer Wald tests in Table), suggesting consistency 
with the Cobb-Douglas specification. The pattern of coefficients is broadly the same 
as in the main results.
29  
5.7    Marshallian vs m-demands 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 show a pair of Marshallian demands, for child and 
adult clothing (refer section 2.3). The key regressor is now total expenditure rather 
than expenditure on a reference (adult) good. For comparability with the main results, 
                                                 
29 The main results are from a linear model (as in Blow et al 2004, Edmonds 2002, Kooreman 
2000, for example).   21  
 
 
total expenditure is instrumented with a cubic in income (refer section 3.2). The ratio 
of the expenditure coefficients is 0.67, which is not significantly different from the 
estimate of ∂ Ci/∂ Aj of 0.56 obtained from the benchmark m-demand. 
 
7 Conclusions 
This paper proposes a simple and intuitive test of parental altruism, which is applied 
to data on parents and young children in a village economy. Previous research on 
intergenerational altruism has investigated a stronger version of altruism -income 
pooling- amongst parents and adult children (see section 1), and previous research on 
child poverty and cash transfers has typically assumed parental altruism. The test 
proposed in this study involves studying the relation between the consumption 
patterns of adults and children. Under altruism, adults cannot increase their own 
consumption of goods (or leisure) without increasing that of their children. The 
evidence is consistent with parental altruism. This is non-trivial, given previous 
rejections of altruism. A more tentative finding is that households that consume 
tobacco spend less on children.  
A number of recent anti-poverty programs in Latin America make cash 
transfers to poor families conditional upon their sending their children to school and 
taking them to health clinics (see World Bank 2001, Becker 1999). This is consistent 
with there being some doubt about parental altruism in the field. Alternatively, it may 
reflect some caution in assuming that parents know what is best for their children. The 
definition of altruism in this paper- and so also in the work of Becker (e.g. Becker 
1981)- is a “working” definition with precise implications for parental expenditure 
decisions. It is not readily distinguished from “myopia” (or knowing what is best), or 
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Budget shares:     
Adult clothing & footwear (A1)    0.043 0.035   0.76 
Tea & coffee (A2)  0.018 0.014   0.60 
Tobacco (A3)  0.020 0.028   0.43 
Adult expend: aggregate of above three items (A4)  0.082 0.051   0.68 
     
Child clothing & footwear (C)  0.029  0.024   0.79 
     
Food  0.537 0.165   0.74 
Education  0.035 0.053   0.96 
Health  0.103 0.137   1.13 
Ceremonies  0.031 0.065   1.20 
     
 
Notes: N=1340 households. The elasticities in column 3 are obtained as θ  from simple regressions of the form lnXk=θ lnX+u, where Xk is 
normalised expenditure for the item in column 1 and X is total expenditure per capita. For the adult goods, the natural normalisation of expenditure 
is per adult. For child clothing and education, it is per child. For food, health and ceremonies, it is per household member. Every reported elasticity 
is statistically significant. A substantial fraction of households report zero spending on tobacco, ceremonies, health and education. In these cases 
the expenditure elasticity is computed for the sub-sample of households that record positive expenditure.  




M-Demands for Child Clothing Expenditure 




 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) 
Panel 1: GMM Estimates      
adult expenditure  0.560**  1.693*  0.325  0.292** 
[0.196] [0.780] [0.240] [0.109] 
Hansen J χ
2; p-value  0.68; 0.71  0.78; 0.68  1.55; 0.46  0.99; 0.61 
1
st stage F on IV; p-value  8.65; 0.00  4.59; 0.01  6.42; 0.00  11.94; 0.00 
1
st stage adjusted R
2    0.19   0.33  0.16  0.24 
      
Panel 2: LIML Estimates      
adult expenditure  0.519**  2.51**  0.159  0.337** 
[0.152] [1.06]  [0.242] [0.096] 
LR test; 95% critical value   13.53; 4.41  13.22; 6.06  0.43; 3.57  13.88; 4.83 
Wald test; 95% critical value  11.79; 3.66  5.86; 2.81  0.47; 2.55  12.35; 4.26 
      
Panel 3: OLS Estimates      
adult  expenditure  0.206** 0.234** 0.100** 0.135** 
[0.047] [0.069] [0.034] [0.024] 
R-square  0.22 0.13 0.18 0.20 
N  1324 1324 926  1324 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels denoted +, * and ** respectively. The dependent variable is 
expenditure on child clothing and footwear, and the regressor of interest is expenditure on adult consumption (Aj). The category of adult 
consumption varies across the four columns. For a discussion of estimators and tests see section 3.2. The GMM estimates have standard errors 
adjusted for cluster-based sampling. Since the F-test on the excluded instruments is <10 in col. 1-3, the LR and Wald tests reported after the LIML 
estimates are size-adjusted tests based on Moreira’s (2002) conditional approach, and these provide the correct rejection probabilities even when 
the instruments are weak. Also see Figure 1. The F test has degrees of freedom (2, 1296), except in col. 3 where this is (2, 898). The Hansen-
Sargan J statistic is distributed as χ
2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions. Estimates of this statistic and of 
the first-stage R




Do Children Get Less in Smoking Households? 
Tests of conditional mean differences 
 
  GMM OLS 
Regression estimates     









2; p-value  0.81; 0.67   
1
st stage F on IV; p-value  6.18; 0.00   
1
st stage adjusted R
2    0.28  0.13 
    
T-tests    
Difference: C0 - C1 21.67  2.30 
t-statistic 14.27  4.05 
p<t: HA: diff<0  1.00  1.00 
p>|t|: HA: diff≠ 0  0.00 0.00 
p>t: HA: diff>0  0.00  0.00 
% change  -55.2  -9.0 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is child clothing expenditure and the reference good is tobacco expenditure. This is similar to column 3 of Table 2 
except that now all households are used and a dummy variable (DS) is defined which equals unity for the 927 (70%) households that report 
positive expenditures on tobacco and zero for the remaining 400 (30%) households. So C = γ 3A3 + γ SDS + θ Z + e. Row 2 shows that γ S<0. LIML 
estimates were obtained though not displayed. The LIML estimate of γ 3 is 1.08, significant at 1%. The LR test statistic is 13.84 which, against a 
(Moreira-adjusted) critical value of 5.48 implies that we can reject the null that γ 3=0. The predicted level of C in a smoking household (DS=1) is 
C1= γ 3A3 + γ S + θ Z and the predicted C in a non-smoking household (DS=0) is C0= θ Z. The mean difference is reported as (C0 - C1), with its t-
statistic. The null hypothesis is that the difference is zero. The p-values indicate whether the difference is statistically significant for the 1-tailed 
and 2-tailed tests defined in terms of the alternative hypotheses, HA. The final row indicates the size of the difference. This is defined as (C0 - C1)/ 
C0, expressed in percentage terms.   28  
 
 
Table 4   

















        
Adult clothing expenditure (A1)  0.605**  0.377** 0.670** 0.480*  0.509*  0.496* 
[0.0968]  [0.0882]  [0.232] [0.198] [0.201] [0.294] 
Child  labour     20.00      
   [20.94]      
Adult labour         -7.833**   
   [3.015]   
Adult female labour         -1.887   
    [1.705]   
Adult male labour         -10.061**   
    [3.039]   
        
Hansen J χ
2; p-value  2.85; 0.97  4.70;  0.58 0.17;  0.92 0.52;  0.77 0.52;  0.77 2.23;  0.33 
C-statistic χ
2; p-value  0.42; 0.94  4.66;  0.46      
1
st stage F on IV; p-value  7.36; 0.00  13.71; 0.00  5.12; 0.00  7.63; 0.00  7.63; 0.00  4.76; 0.00 
         
 
Notes: See Notes to Table 2, and Section 5. Table 2, column 1 is the benchmark model. These are GMM estimates. N=1324, except in column 3, 
where it is 780. The additional instruments used in column 1 are detailed in section 5.1. The C-statistic is a test of the orthogonality of a specified 
sub-set of the instruments. In column 1, this is the income cubic. In column 2, it is the set of variables added to instrument child labour (listed in 
section 5.2).  
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Table 5  
Logarithmic and Marshallian Demands 
 logarithmic  Marshallian  Marshallian 
dependent variable:  Child clothing, C  Child clothing, C  Adult clothing, A1 
     
Adult clothing expenditure (A1)  0.844**    
  [0.178]    
Total household expenditure p.c.    0.0299***  0.0444*** 
   [0.003]  [0.013] 
     
Hansen J χ
2(2); p-value  3.61; 0.17  0.55; 0.76  2.15; 0.34 
F(IV); p-value  6.71; 0.00  25.51; 0.00  25.51; 0.00 
1
st stage adjusted R
2  0.22 0.11 0.11 
Wald test elasticity(γ j)=1: χ
2(1); p-value  0.77; 0.38     
 
Notes: See Notes to Table 2, and section 5. These are GMM estimates. The Wald test is a test of the null that the elasticity ∂ logCi/∂ logAj (reported 
as 0.844 in column 1) is 1. Columns 2 and 3 together imply that ∂ C/∂ A1=(∂ C/∂ m)/(∂ A1/∂ m)=0.67, which is not significantly different from 0.56 in 
Table 2, column 1. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A1 
Child Clothing (C): GMM Estimates of M-Demands 
 Adult clothing Tea&  Coffee Tobacco Tobacco Adult  goods 
 (A1) (A2) (A3); smokers  (A3); all hhs  (A4) 
adult expenditure  0.560**  1.693*  0.325  0.973*  0.292** 
  [0.196] [0.780] [0.240] [0.488] [0.109] 
1(tobacco>0)     -49.015*   
     [24.063]   
ln household size  6.634*  15.853*  8.376+  16.710*  8.945* 
  [3.281] [7.682] [4.723] [7.140] [3.850] 
prop 10-14 boys  -33.861**  -19.291  -18.697+  -20.518  -27.737** 
  [10.063] [13.758] [9.877]  [12.917] [9.415] 
prop  males  15-24  15.697+ 47.424* 13.299  35.120+ 25.828* 
  [8.017]  [20.203] [13.694] [20.143] [10.706] 
prop males 25-59  11.297  37.935+  -6.700  17.542  12.058 
  [12.762] [21.931] [11.591] [14.852] [11.836] 
prop males >60  -2.109  28.933  -0.337  24.964  6.666 
  [16.606] [27.430] [21.914] [30.208] [19.428] 
prop  10-14  girls  -19.375+  -2.285  4.159 0.150 -9.427 
  [10.777] [12.965] [11.831] [13.035] [10.087] 
prop females 15-24  24.921+  54.086*  16.006  32.665  33.942* 
  [12.924] [25.818] [16.685] [22.207] [15.420] 
prop  females  25-59  37.520* 62.120+ 47.661* 69.108* 46.720* 
  [16.549] [32.157] [22.622] [29.881] [20.162] 
prop  females  >60  42.773* 84.113* 39.376  68.454* 56.677* 
  [19.821] [38.478] [25.465] [34.644] [23.004] 
non-muslim 7.028 12.360+  9.201 8.330 5.881 
  [5.073] [6.790] [6.165] [8.646] [5.705] 
female  head 1.204 0.064 1.351 -6.096  -0.315 
  [3.605] [5.675] [4.046] [5.325] [3.726] 
acres  0.178 0.273 0.345 0.295 0.207 
  [0.358] [0.266] [0.286] [0.278] [0.329] 
rent 0.102  1.135  -0.966  -2.318  1.045 
  [2.042] [2.925] [2.306] [3.337] [2.270] 
sharecrop  -0.128 -0.453 0.707  -1.127 -0.818 
  [1.757] [2.842] [2.425] [2.711] [1.724] 
own  land  -1.176 -3.360 1.622  -0.091 -0.705 
  [3.087] [3.201] [2.849] [2.974] [2.873] 
own  enterprise  1.750 2.361 1.716 0.596 1.531 
  [1.992] [2.182] [1.911] [3.188] [2.082] 
primary  school  2.135  5.083+ 4.731+ 3.608  2.348 
  [2.051] [2.837] [2.441] [3.172] [1.947] 
middle  school  0.317 1.400 0.211 -0.458  0.667 
  [1.849] [2.667] [1.924] [2.994] [1.953] 
secondary  school  0.647  -3.278 -0.986 -2.749 -1.188 
  [2.090] [3.110] [2.407] [2.614] [1.873] 
ln  child  wage  2.624  -2.171 -1.766 -1.972 0.132 
  [2.341] [2.400] [1.663] [2.042] [1.683] 
ln  adult  wage  -3.186 -2.513 8.394* 6.033  -0.127 
  [6.984] [8.667] [3.549] [6.307] [6.404] 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. Tests on IV are in Table 2. Province dummies included. prop is proportion, 
acres is of land owned, ln is log. Other than acres and log wages, variables are dummies.   31  
 
 
Appendix: A Simple Test of Altruism 
The utility function of the altruistic parent is :  
 
(1a) U = U (A, C, S)  
 
where A and C denote above-subsistence adult and child consumption respectively, and S is 
shared subsistence consumption. Both A and C are vectors of goods but, for simplicity, the 
exposition treats them as single goods. The utility function of the egoistic parent is a restricted 
form of (1a): 
 
(1b) U = U (A, S)  
 
It is assumed that even the selfish parent ensures that the child survives. The budget constraint is  
 
(2) paA+ pcC + psS = m  
 
where m is full income and p=(pa, pc, ps) is a vector of prices. The null hypothesis is that parents 
are selfish. The first order conditions (FOCs) of interest are:  
  
 
where Ui denotes the marginal utility that adults derive from consumption of good i. Equation (3) 
holds as an equality if C<C
* where C
* is the level of C at which the marginal utility of C is zero. 
By the implicit function theorem, the equation g(A , C) = θ   has a unique solution for C as a 
function of A in a neighbourhood of the optimal quantities of A and C. Moreover, for the solution 
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The sign of the expression in (4) depends upon the signs of the cross-partials, (∂ UA/∂ C) and 
(∂ UC/∂ A), which are ambiguous in the general case. However, for the commonly used utility 
functions in the literature, these cross-partials are non-negative,
30 in which case altruism predicts 
∂ C/∂ A > 0. Imposing the restriction implicit in (1b) would yield ∂ C/∂ A = 0.  
 
                                                 
30 As an example, consider the additively separable utility function U = u1(A) + u2(C), for which 











′′ <0 (diminishing marginal returns), ∂ C/∂ A>0. Alternatively, for the 
popular special case, the Cobb-Douglas function, U = A
α C
β , U12 ≡  (∂ UA/∂ C) = (αβ U)/AC > 0, and 
the result follows in a similar way. Separability of parent and child consumption is typically 
assumed (see Becker 1991, Baland and Robinson 2000).   33  
 
 
Figure 1: Conditional Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics and Critical Values Adjusted 



























Notes: See Section 3.2 of the text. Beta is the (scaled) coefficient on the adult 
expenditure. The asymptotic critical value (CV) is the flat line (lr), the adjusted CV is the 
jagged line (lrcrit) and the confidence region is the region of the graph where the 














































































































































































































































































1. Adult clothing, 2. Tea & coffee, 3. Tobacco, 4. Aggregate of 1-3. Details in text
beta is coefficient on Aj*100
Moreira's LR Statistic